Utilização das quotas individuais transferíveis na gestão pesqueira global : os casos do Banco Mundial e da Comissão Internacional para a Conservação do Atum do Atlântico

Abstract

This work aimed to analyze the applicability of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) in fisheries management. In particular, to discuss the World Bank’s propositions which promote the use of ITQs in fisheries management. As a counterpoint, was also discussed the management system used by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the use of Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) and Harvest Control Rules (HCR) as supplementary tools to increase its current system as an alternative to ITQs. As a differential approach, since many studies have already showed the economic efficiency of ITQs, this work focused on analyzing their socioenvironmental impacts. Analysis demonstrated ITQs have a huge impact maximizing fishing profits, as the number of participants is decreased. However, their influence on stocks sustainability has not been proven. In addition, the tool promotes the exclusion of thousands of fishermen of fisheries activity, producing an extremely negative social impact, mainly to developing countries. On the other hand, the use of supplementary management tools, such as Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) and Harvest Control Rules (HCR), proposed by ICCAT to increase its traditional management system, presents advantages to the use of ITQs regarding their social and environmental impacts, especially regarding stocks management. Since using the MSE and HCRs is the state of the stocks, considering that the mechanisms to fix quota values have been pre-agreed by fixed rules, and not the interests of the fishing nations, which is the determining factor for the management actions.